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The electronic monitoring of offenders: penal moderation or penal excess? 
 
Richard Jones1 
 
Abstract The technologies used in the electronic monitoring of offenders continue to 
develop, and next-generation “tags” will likely feature new capabilities. As the 
technology becomes more powerful, older criminal justice institutions and practices 
may appear increasingly anachronistic in one form or other, and their legitimacy 
called into question. Electronic monitoring systems may appear progressive 
alternatives to older forms of punishing. However, given the surveillant and 
controlling qualities of electronic monitoring systems, extending their use is in many 
respects troubling. This article seeks to examine the electronic monitoring of 
offenders in the light of the concepts of “penal moderation” and “penal excess”, as 
well as to reflect on this sanction at the interface of the academic fields of the 
sociology of punishment and surveillance studies. It is argued that issues relating to 
intended aims and actual effects of the electronic monitoring of offenders go to the 
heart of contemporary debates and contradictions regarding penal purpose, the effects 
of the criminal justice system, electronic surveillance, and explanations of penal 
change. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A question societies must decide today in respect of their criminal justice systems is 
whether to embrace the electronic monitoring of offenders with a view to enrolling 
substantially greater numbers of offenders on such programmes, or whether to oppose 
such an expansion. On the one hand electronic monitoring schemes may appear 
preferable to incarceration, for example, given what is known about the damaging 
effects of custodial sentences on offenders; yet on the other hand, the surveillant 
nature of the penalty, coupled with the likely greatly enhanced monitoring capabilities 
of the technology in the future, raise serious concerns as to whether we are ushering 
in an insidious and powerful new form of social control. Previous research has 
provided detailed discussion of the historical, organisational, legal and technical 
aspects of schemes for the electronic monitoring of offenders (see e.g. [35-37, 56, 57, 
59, 66, 74]), and in this article I will instead seek to discuss wider considerations 
regarding the wisdom of future development of such schemes, and as such aim to 
contribute to wider debate on this topic (e.g. [10, 19, 34, 43, 61, 63, 65, 66, 70]). 
 The question as to the desirability or otherwise of the electronic monitoring of 
offenders can be separated out into various distinct issues, but here the argument is 
advanced through consideration of two themes that have attracted the attention of 
sociologists of punishment in recent years, namely penal “excess”, of the kind often 
associated with “penal populism”, and “penal moderation”, a concept that has been 
proposed with the aim of fostering a more temperate penal climate. This article seeks 
to examine the electronic monitoring of offenders in the light of the concepts of 
“penal moderation” and “penal excess”, as well as to reflect on this sanction at the 
interface of the academic fields of the sociology of punishment and surveillance 																																																								
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studies. The structure of the argument is as follows. First, some contours of the nature 
of the problem with punishment today, as well as of the problems in analysing the 
same, are outlined. Second, the features of “penal moderation” are discussed, and 
consideration is given as to how the electronic monitoring of offenders might be 
consistent with such a philosophy. The notion of “penal excess” is then introduced, 
and the problems of excessive surveillance and of the threats posed by “penal-
surveillant” measures are examined. The future of electronic monitoring is considered 
in the context of emerging trends and new theoretical accounts of penal policy. The 
article concludes by reflecting on some of the contradictions within electronic 
monitoring, and argues that it is indeed a “civilised” form of punishment (in Elias’s 
sense), with all the irony that entails. 
 
 
Imprisonment, sentencing and reconfiguring criminal justice 
 
Today, around the world, a large number of offenders are in prisons, jails or other 
places of detention. One account of the apparent rise in punitiveness in many Western 
countries from the 1970s-2000s is in terms of the political appeal of “penal populism” 
[8], [73]. Whilst this term neatly captures certain qualities of what is undoubtedly a 
real phenomenon, it also has some analytic limitations: politically reactionary 
sentencing may be lenient rather than punitive [41]; it is not always clear whether the 
empirical features to which “penal populism” refers are to political machinations, 
popular or political discourse, the punitiveness of a sanction, or the numbers of people 
punished; and may lead us to overstate the extent of penal populism’s actual appeal 
and political support, both within a particular society and internationally. While 
“penal populism” may today enjoy a “hegemonic” position in penal political ideology 
in some countries, even there, countervailing penal values retain some currency. If 
more progressive penal politics are to dominate, we may ask how a sufficiently 
powerful interest bloc can come together and subscribe to shared penal ideologies and 
values. 
If there is an impetus toward penal change it may derive from growing public 
awareness of the consequence of current practices. There is no doubt that many 
offenders deserve to be incarcerated, and that many require detaining in order to 
protect the public. However, there are also reasons to suspect that not all of those 
detained need to be there, either for moral or public safety reasons. International 
comparisons of imprisonment rates reveal huge differences as between countries’ 
reliance on prison, even as between those that are geographically close or might 
appear culturally similar [84], and increased public awareness of this could prompt a 
country to reassess its sentencing practices. Research on the consequences of 
imprisonment suggests that prisons have numerous harmful effects on prisoners and 
their families, both during imprisonment and post-release. Moreover, a high rate of 
recidivism by former prisoners suggests that prisons are not very successful at 
rehabilitating, and even that prisons may have a ‘criminogenic’ quality. A further, 
pressing argument for reducing the number of offenders sent to prison today is cost. 
Prisons are expensive [32, 55]. In addition to a high financial cost, public expenditure 
on prisons also represents an ‘opportunity cost’ (resources directed to prisons could 
have been directed instead to another area of criminal justice, or to education or 
health, for example). Such various considerations, while disparate, have the potential 
to feed into and offer momentum to reformist agendas. 
 Societal decisions regarding sentencing take place in the context of wider debates 
about and contemporary developments within criminal justice. The use of the money 
fine seems likely to change as electronic systems make it progressively easier to levy 
fines in an automated fashion, and is foreshadowed by the use of police-issued “on-
the-spot” fines [67]. Community penalties continue to be used extensively, though 
face challenges ranging from how best to command public support to reconciling 
humanist ideology with technocratic practice (see for example [54]). Restorative 
justice could conceivably become more widely used than at present. Desistance 
research is shedding light on how best to support offenders in turning around their 
lives (see for example [83]). All the while, research suggests that even “welfarist” 
interventions can have negative effects on young offenders [53], which could prompt 
calls for further diversion strategies or even the scaling back of criminal justice 
apparatus as a whole. Public support for, and extent of use by sentencers of electronic 
monitoring take place within this wider context and in relation to what are perceived 
and permitted as appropriate option alternatives. 
 Two distinct (though in respects interrelated) processes may be identified here. 
The first is the empirical matter as to the decisions different societies make, the 
consequences that result, and how best to account for how these decisions and 
consequences came about. The second is the normative issue as to what decisions 
should be made. This distinction, between positive and normative accounts, is of 
course very familiar within social science, but is particularly useful to maintain when 
approaching the examination of questions of penal severity in general and the severity 
of electronically monitoring offenders in particular. 
 
 
Penal moderation 
 
Against the backdrop of the hegemony that punitive sentencing currently appears to 
enjoy in English penal politics, Loader has argued for greater “penal moderation” 
[45]. In his view, the key qualities of penal moderation as a philosophy of punishment 
are a commitment to the values of restraint, parsimony and dignity. He argues that 
these could serve as organising principles by which moderates might engage in penal 
policy formation and public debate surrounding punishment, with the aim of opposing 
the excesses of penal populism. He distinguishes between two possible strategies to 
this end, namely “moderation-by-stealth” and “moderation-as-politics”, favouring the 
latter as a more principled and democratically accountable approach. At the time of its 
formulation, the idea of “penal moderation” sounded somewhat optimistic; its values 
of “restraint, parsimony and dignity” are liberal-sounding and, while deeply 
principled and attractive to some, seemed unlikely to command widespread popular 
support in relation to criminal justice. However, the general sentiment behind the 
notion of “moderation” does appear increasingly resonant with the times, and it is not 
impossible to imagine some future popular political ideology tapping into certain of 
its elements (for example, by conjoining a supposed trait of victor’s mercy with 
national identity: “in this country we treat even our offenders with respect”). 
Bosworth, and Gartner et al., have explored the prospects for penal moderation in the 
United States [7, 28]. As Bosworth and others have pointed out, there are now some 
reasons to be hopeful, with various US states and countries now witnessing a decline 
in the number of people held in prison. If the first meaning (above) of the term ‘penal 
moderation’ was as a philosophy of punishment, these recent empirical developments 
draw our attention to the second possible meaning of the term, namely as a 
sociological descriptor, referring to an apparent historical social shift (even if it is too 
soon to claim that we are entering the early stages of a historical period of penal 
moderation). 
 
 
Electronic monitoring of offenders as penal moderation 
 
Loader sets out in detail the principles underlying penal moderation, but leaves open 
the question as to how such principles might be realised. One sanction that could in 
theory be attractive to proponents of penal moderation is the electronic monitoring of 
offenders. Electronic monitoring schemes monitor offenders’ compliance with some 
form of court order, for example a home curfew order, exclusion order, or drugs or 
alcohol abstinence order. The reasoning behind moderates’ advocacy of electronic 
monitoring schemes could be as follows. Electronic monitoring represents a possible 
alternative to a custodial sentence for some offenders, thus reducing society’s use of 
the prison. The sanction allows offenders to remain in their homes and communities, 
and alongside their families. It is “restrained” in that is a “thin” form of punishing, 
otherwise permitting normal activities during non-curfew hours. It is “parsimonious” 
not only because it is far cheaper than prison, but also because it involves only the 
partial deprivation of liberty. Lastly, it is “dignified” insofar as the monitored person 
is able to lead much of their life as normal. 
 More generally, electronic monitoring might be thought to represent a “low key” 
or even largely socially “invisible” form of punishing, one that does not rely on 
conspicuous display of public symbols for its effect. Perhaps the clearest respect in 
which electronic monitoring might be said to be “moderate” is in comparison to 
imprisonment, and in particular in the extent to which it is used expressly and 
effectively as an alternative to imprisonment and in recognition of the pains and 
damage prison inflicts on those sent there (which appears to be the case to some 
extent in Sweden, for example [10]). (This is not to say that its relative moderation 
renders it ethically unproblematic, and as Bülow notes various ethical issues remain 
[9].) Lastly, from a broader perspective, its use may have a certain social symbolism, 
representing a reformist attempt to improve upon the problems associated with 
established criminal justice institutions. Yet, while electronic monitoring might be 
considered a “moderate” and indeed “moderating” punishment in many respects, 
might it nevertheless introduce its own particular “excesses”? 
 
 
Penal excess 
 
In a discussion of the brutal “public torture lynching” executions carried out in some 
southern states in the US in the early decades of the twentieth century, David Garland 
draws attention to how cruel but also how taken-for-granted were those extra-judicial 
killings. Those executed invariably were black (accused of the rape or murder of 
white victims) and the spectators white. Photographs taken of the “mutilated black 
bodies, some of them horribly burned and disfigured, were purchased as picture 
postcards, and passed between friends and families like holiday mementoes, dutifully 
delivered by the U.S. mail” ([26], p. 794). These killings should be understood, he 
argues, as an attempt by white southerners to maintain racial domination in the face of 
the wider gradual erosion of their established way of living. Garland describes as 
“penal excess” the “self-consciously excessive retributive ritual… a strategic means 
adopted by political actors to communicate meanings and sentiments” ([26], p. 801). 
“Penal excess” here thus captures what was almost a “war-like” ritual, 
communicating multiple cultural and “reactionary” political meanings through its 
grotesque defiance of established law and justice. (The mode of execution, we might 
add, is strangely reminiscent of that employed to execute Damiens as famously retold 
by Foucault in Discipline and Punish [21].) 
 Yet the phrase “penal excess” could be used in other ways as well. Whereas 
Garland uses the term to capture and make sense of extreme and torturous executions 
– in other words of the “quality” of punishment employed – one could also describe 
as “excessive” the practice of punishing a large proportion of a population, in other 
words a matter of “quantity”, as is implied in the pejorative term “mass 
imprisonment”. Punishment could further be said to be of “excessive” quantity insofar 
as a given penalty (for example, the sentence length or amount fined) was 
disproportionately severe given the moral wrong committed (see e.g. [81]). (As Frost 
points out, the distinction between these two meanings is not always made clear [22].) 
Alternatively, “excess” could instead be used to describe the highly negative 
“collateral” or “secondary” consequences of punishment, extending beyond the 
formal punishment itself, whether as experienced by individuals or by larger 
communities [52]. Another meaning again of the term could be to capture a quality of 
a punishment that was thought to be more severe than was required, for example as 
with deliberately stigmatising penalties designed to humiliate convicted offenders in 
public, or lengthy solitary confinement. The term could be used to describe the 
inappropriateness of prison for certain offenders, such as fine defaulters, young 
offenders, or female petty offenders [12]. Lastly, the term “penal excess” could be 
used to capture the application of the prison-like regimes used to prepare detainees 
(some of whom have never been convicted of a criminal offence, others of whom 
have already served their sentence) for deportation or to secure them for extended 
periods of time, as for example at Immigration Removal Centres, or Guantanamo Bay 
[6, 78, 79]. 
 The term “penal excess” can therefore be seen to be a wide-ranging one, perhaps 
even one lacking in conceptual unity. However, its multiple meanings also are useful 
in this regard, offering us a way of identifying and exploring the consequences of 
punishment and of reflecting upon questions of proportionality and social 
acceptability. 
 
 
Surveillant excess 
 
In the field of surveillance studies, a number of authors have identified and charted 
the increased proliferation of surveillance technologies in recent decades (see e.g. [3, 
47]). Theories of surveillance have been proposed; the meanings and implications of 
surveillance practices documented; the grounds on which surveillance might be 
opposed have been explored (for example the threat they pose to privacy, or their 
“chilling effects” on open political debate); and measures and frameworks designed to 
contain or regulate surveillance practices and systems have been developed [33]. It 
has been suggested, indeed, that the ubiquity of such technologies today makes ours a 
“surveillance society” [46]. 
Within surveillance studies, the particular topic of the electronic monitoring of 
offenders has not been especially widely discussed, perhaps because until relatively 
recently much electronically “tagging” involved simple RFID technology enabling 
only rudimentary surveillance; perhaps because the targets of such 
punishment/surveillance are quite specific and relatively few in number (compared, at 
least, to the number of people whose Internet activities are routinely surveilled in one 
way or another); and perhaps because electronic monitoring has been discussed 
extensively and effectively in other academic fields, and in particular within 
criminology and criminal justice. Yet, arguably, the electronic monitoring of 
offenders stands at the intersection of these two academic domains. 
While surveillance scholars do not generally use the language of “moderation” or 
“excess” (either normatively or positively) in relation to surveillance, there are 
nevertheless various points of linkage relevant to the present discussion. Broadly 
critical in stance, the field of surveillance studies generally stands in opposition to 
ever-expanding surveillant practices. The question of (excessive) scale is often 
referred to empirically (such as in an oft-mentioned statistic relating to the supposed 
number of CCTV cameras in the UK); while in theoretical understanding, tropes such 
as the “Big Brother” society [68], the “Panopticon” [21], the “surveillant assemblage” 
[31], or the “surveillance society” [46], allude to the use of surveillance technologies 
on a huge or even totalising scale. The development of digital communications and 
powerful computing systems has enabled governments to move from narrow 
“targeted” surveillance to general “mass surveillance” [49]. A notion of 
proportionality has however attended to legal and legislative attempts at constraining 
the “targeted” surveillance of individuals, with intensive surveillance of suspects 
(such as wire-tapping, or intercepting the contents of emails) requiring law 
enforcement to demonstrate proper need, and hence implying the recognition that 
some forms of surveillance may be “excessive” and hence unjustified. The advent of 
the era of “mass surveillance”, as confirmed in spectacular fashion by Edward 
Snowden, a former private contractor who worked for the USA’s electronic 
communications spy agency, the NSA, moves discussion relating to “excess” to 
include not just the degree of penetration into knowledge about citizens’ personal 
lives, but also the surveillance of innocent citizens, with uncertain legal authority and 
oversight, and on an epic scale [30]. Forthcoming legal and political debates 
concerning such practices will likely involve consideration as to whether such mass 
collection of data is “excessive” (as it would certainly appear initially, at least in 
terms of scale), or if it is proportionate and justified where data are retained but only 
ever studied subsequently when there is good reason. 
 
 
Penal-surveillant excess 
 
There are arguably some parallels as between the studies of surveillance and 
punishment, in terms of establishing their degrees of apparent “excess”, as well as 
establishing the normative and political grounds on which one might best oppose or 
attempt to restrict or “moderate” their use. However, consideration of the more 
substantive connection between criminology and surveillance studies in relation to 
electronic monitoring and questions of “acceptability” requires us to backtrack and 
consider how we are best to understand a sanction such as this that appears both 
punitive and surveillant. This requires us in turn to re-examine the “punitive” element 
of punishment. One line of argument here derives from Foucault, and proposes that, 
rather than assume “punishment” has a particular quality or essence, a better way to 
approach the topic is to ask how societies go about punishing at different times in 
history. As is well known, Foucault’s own conclusion here was that punishment today 
is “disciplinary” in kind, designed to establish and instil a gentle but powerful form of 
social (and self-) control [21]. Punishment today may superficially appear less 
“punitive” than in the past, but this masks its far greater surveillant powers of control. 
The broader point still is that “punishment” does not have an essence, and instead 
needs to be studied sociologically and empirically to establish its workings at a given 
place and time. Here, it may be found to be more or less obviously “punitive”, and 
may be inflected, or even dominated by other principles. For example, Donzelot 
shows how French probation work had a disciplinary-like judging quality, intruding 
into family life [18]. Garland has shown how “welfare” considerations came to 
inhabit the criminal justice system in England and Wales in the early twentieth 
century, forming the origins of probation and the “penal welfare” system [23]. 
Garland and Young have further argued for the “social” analysis of “penality”, the 
latter a term intended to refer to systems and practices involving punishment but not 
necessary reducible to (retributive) punishment alone [27]. 
 Such an analytical perspective adds a nuance to one of the issues that has 
attended the electronic monitoring of offenders from the outset, namely as to what is 
its purpose (as Nellis once noted, it has often appeared “a technology in search of a 
problem” ([58], p. 140)). In the language of “sentencing rationales” (see e.g. [2, 38]) 
electronic monitoring might be seen to involve a mixture (in uncertain proportions) of 
“retribution” (deliberate infliction of hardship, here through restriction of liberty); 
“incapacitation” (of a virtual, self-compliant kind); “deterrence” (whether to the 
individual offender or to the general public); and “rehabilitation” (of a limited kind 
for now, by way of stabilising offenders’ otherwise chaotic lives; or through joining 
EM with more specifically rehabilitative treatment; and in the future possibly of a 
more involved kind [42]). It might even be seen to have some “restorative” qualities 
(serving a sentence in the community, and rebuilding social bonds). However, which 
of these dominate in practice, and hence are most characteristic of the sanction, may 
vary across time and place, and is thus a matter for empirical determination. 
Moreover, uncertainty or debate surrounding these goals, and the degree to which EM 
is seen to achieve them, may be “drivers” in directing the development of the sanction 
in one way or another. For example, it appears that in Victoria, Australia, a desire for 
greater retribution appears a factor in abandoning EM based on RFID tags, though 
may yet lead to the adoption of more “controlling” GPS-based systems; whereas in 
Scandinavia, more rehabilitative goals are apparent [10, 50]. 
In a recent and thought-provoking piece, Nellis notes that, in an age where many 
citizens are locatable via their mobile phones, “the state’s (or its commercial proxies’) 
capacity to pinpoint the whereabouts of a curfewed offender at night, or a tracked 
offender 24/7, is hardly, nowadays, the fearful spectre it would have appeared to 
George Orwell in the mid-20th century; it is simply a point toward the coercive end of 
a continuum of locatability”. Moreover, he reflects, “the question that arises is less 
‘why would the state want to remotely monitor and manage offenders’ locations?’ and 
more ‘why would it not?’” [62]. The state’s desire to undertake a certain action does 
not however mean that it is right or socially desirable for it to do so. Indeed, in the 
light of recent revelations regarding mass surveillance, it may be that in the future the 
world’s citizens become altogether more cautious about the technologies they use, 
and demand privacy controls over their data (including geographic positional data). 
Similarly, we might acknowledge the desire of the state to obtain information on 
offenders, but seek to constrain the data obtained and how it was used only to that 
which is proportionate and strictly necessary. 
 The electronic monitoring of offenders might be said to be “excessive” in terms 
of the “excess” of data such surveillance generates, especially with regards to GPS 
systems and body-monitoring technologies. As surveillance and Internet activists 
have pointed out, geographic positional information can reveal much about a person’s 
habits, associates, work, leisure activities and even religious beliefs. The latest tags 
can detect certain substances consumed by the tag-wearer; and future technology 
could involve additional biometric sensors or even subcutaneous tags [61]. It is not 
clear that much of the positional data, in particular, is necessary for compliance 
monitoring purposes, and one solution would be to restrict how much data is 
ordinarily available to or is retained by the monitoring agencies [19]. A further sense 
in which surveillant monitoring might be said to be excessive is in respect of the 
technocratic control system to which the monitored person is subject. Insofar as the 
tag is not removed and the monitoring system is comprehensive, there is an 
inescapability as to the surveillance, as well as a dehumanising quality [40]. The 
question of the sanction’s “excess” is also tied up with its perceived severity and 
actual effects, and which may be experienced differently by different groups. One 
study found that “offenders saw prison as more punitive than EM”, but also that 
“older offenders find EM more punitive than younger offenders” ([72], p.144; 145). 
Indeed, an earlier study found those monitored to experience numerous “pains” of 
confinement, some similar to those experienced by prisoners, and some additional 
ones specific to the sanction [71]. However, another study of tagged offenders found 
that although “most preferred electronic monitoring to prison, but this was not the 
case for all the offenders and every circumstance” ([80], p. 273). Tags and curfew 
hours seem designed for men, and may impact differently upon and indeed bear more 
stigma for female offenders [34]. Additionally, different monitoring systems may be 
experienced more or less punitively—for example, GPS “tracking” systems may feel 
more punitive to offenders than do those involving older and more rudimentary non-
tracking tags. 
 There is a further way in which questions of “punishment” and “surveillance” are 
entangled in relation to EM and proportionality, namely in the case of their use in 
monitoring terror suspects. One of the spurs behind the development of “mass 
surveillance” in Western democracies appears to have been the 9/11 (2001) terror 
attacks, the subsequent bombings in Europe (in Madrid in 2004, and in London in 
2005), and the fear of the possibility of future attacks both from overseas and 
domestically from within. In the UK, one initial government response was the 
detention without trial of terror suspects in a maximum-security prison. Ruled 
unlawful by the House of Lords, the government introduced “control orders”, 
allowing people suspected of involvement in terror activities, even though not 
convicted in a court of law, to be subject to far-reaching restrictions including 
electronically-monitored home curfews of up to 16 hours each day [60]. In 2012 these 
measures were in turn replaced by “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures” (or “TPIMs”, as they have become known), which are more limited and 
scope and which expire after two years, but which still involve the electronically 
monitored imposition of curfews on suspected individuals, and which retain many of 
the earlier features of control orders [39]. 
This use of EM might appear a very particular case, and indeed the number of 
suspects currently so monitored in the UK is tiny (currently about 10 persons). 
Nevertheless, TPIMs arguably represent both a troubling case and a notable point of 
intersection. They are troubling because of their surveillant and punitive excess, since 
they are applied to suspects rather than convicted criminals. If the measures have been 
moderated somewhat, this seems in large part due to the UK legal system and the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Ironically (and echoing some of the 
uncertainties discussed above), in the light of the absconding of some “controlees”, 
some have criticised TPIMs as not being restrictive enough. The measures are 
notable, however, because they involve the use of electronic monitoring outside of 
conventional criminal justice, in a way that is pre-emptive and surveillant, and as such 
represent what Zedner has referred to as a “pre-crime” response to a perceived threat 
[85]. A central concern therefore is that this places in the hands of the Executive an 
unusual power, and one bearing an inescapably political quality. 
 
 
Reducing prison populations? 
 
One of the aims of the pioneers of electronic monitoring was none other than to 
“empty the world’s prisons” [75]. Nellis points out that although such a claim could 
be read as proposing “‘just another’ alternative to custody”, this would be to miss the 
utopianism that animated the broader project—even if this utopianism was of a 
technological kind and intertwined with various technological, military and economic 
infrastructural developments, and even if some of the end results, for example in 
relation to tagged sex offenders in the United States, could sometimes hardly appear 
more dystopian [64]. Following Lilly [44], Nellis argues that, “there was neither need, 
inclination nor likelihood of ‘the complex’ as a whole aligning itself with a prison 
reduction strategy, let alone the naïve abolitionism of Schwitzgebel (1964) or Toombs 
(1995), because many of its constituent parts have a continuing commercial stake in 
the expansion of imprisonment itself”. If EM didn’t expand as much as it might have 
done, then, this is in part due to the “vast…investment that the US still has in 
imprisonment” ([64], p. 183-4). 
The optimism and vision of the prison abolitionism movement can seem distant 
today [5, 13, 51]. Yet, even if abolitionism is completely off the policy agenda, a raft 
of powerful critiques continues to be directed at the penal system, some inspired by 
abolitionism’s original impulse. In the UK, Sim has forcefully levelled a far-reaching 
critique of the dismal prison system and the punitive politics that surround it, 
suggesting that the abolitionist voice is far from dead [76]. In the United States, 
Davis, Wacquant and Alexander have indicted the penal system and in particular its 
inescapably racial dimension [1, 16, 82]. Moreover, in that same country the death 
penalty’s future now looks uncertain, which was not the case even a few years ago. 
 Yet today there are signs of change, and it is possible the era of the “culture of 
control” [25] is starting to give way to something else. Evidence suggests that the 
reasons why prison rates increased in certain countries (e.g. the United States) as from 
about 35 years ago may be due to the outcome of a mixture of harsher sentencing (e.g. 
mandatory minimum sentences) and more restrictive prisoner release regimes, set 
within the context of a more punitive social sentiment ([28], pp. 293-294). Yet, over 
the past decade or so, the prison population of some U.S. states has actually declined, 
most notably those of California and New York. Gartner et al., citing Greene and 
Mauer, suggest that where such change has come about it is because, “conscious 
efforts to change policies and practices . . . relied on many different types of reform 
initiatives . . . and had the twin goals of reducing the prison population and promoting 
cost-effective approaches to public safety” ([28], p. 295; [29], p. 2). Specifically, 
successful strategies have included moving away from mandatory minimum 
sentencing and easing the rules by which released prisoners might be returned to 
prison for subsequent violations ([28], p. 295). 
 Penal reform campaigners may wish to advance policy by endorsing alternatives 
to imprisonment. Yet from a critical perspective, electronic monitoring would appear 
suspect for several reasons. In countries in which electronic monitoring is run by 
profit-led private security companies, its increased use may represent further 
expansion of the “crime control industry” ([14]). Its use might lead to “net-widening” 
rather than diversion away from prison (see [48]; [17], pp. 31-32; see also [15], pp.41-
43). Most fundamentally, it replicates rather than replaces the logic underlying 
existing state institutional responses to socially undesirable behaviour. Even if greater 
use of EM were to lead to smaller prison populations, it would appear reformist rather 
than transformative in nature. 
Indeed, recent research in the sociology of punishment suggests that rather than 
basing theories primarily on macro-level accounts, better explanations of comparative 
differences (in imprisonment rates, for example, can be found at a more local level 
and/or when these incorporate accounts of political processes [4, 11, 69]). If this is 
correct, such analyses pose both an opportunity and a challenge for advocates of 
electronic monitoring. The opportunity lies in the political possibility of driving 
uptake of the use of such sanctions through engagement at a regional or even very 
local level. The challenge is that where prison populations are already declining it is 
not clear that greater reliance on electronic monitoring is warranted, at least if the 
rationale for embracing the technology is as an alternative to prison. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many years ago, Norbert Elias noted how societies seem subject to a very long term 
“civilising process”, in which the twin mechanisms of state development and the 
prohibitions it enforced, along with internalised self-control, increasingly led people 
to become more “ashamed” of base behaviours than before. In turn, related conduct 
became ever-more refined, or more concealed from everyday life—more “civilised”, 
in an ironic and hypocritical sense [20]. Spierenburg [77] and Garland [24] have 
shown how such a model can account for historical changes in penal practices. This 
has led to certain paradoxes, for example where societal support for the death penalty 
has been retained once more “civilised” killing techniques have replaced discredited 
older methods. The electronic monitoring of offenders features paradoxes of its own. 
It permits the close monitoring of offenders while allowing them to remain in their 
communities. It allows offenders a certain degree of autonomy and liberty. It can help 
protect potential victims. The sanction can work alongside rehabilitative measures. In 
some respects, electronic monitoring presents opportunities for the moderation of our 
penal systems. On the other hand, electronic monitoring brings with it surveillant 
practices that can only strike us as regrettable, and may represent the emergence of a 
control system whose future capabilities we do not yet know. As technology 
progresses, as it inevitably will, the monitoring systems will become smaller, more 
discreet and less visibly stigmatising—and yet somehow even more insidious as a 
result. But there are perhaps deeper contradictions still. There seems a technological 
inevitably that some form of monitoring technology will play a major role in penal 
systems in years to come, yet this technology seems set both to liberate and to 
subjugate. We may avail ourselves of new schemes and systems only to find these 
warped by institutional or commercial imperatives. And, just as we “civilise” our 
punishment with powerful technology, so it becomes ever more hidden and private: 
out of sight and out of mind, but no less punitive for all that. 
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